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Empathy or Empathies?  
Uncertainties in the Interdisciplinary Discussion
1. The Definitions of Empathy
Can you imagine putting yourself “in someone else’s shoes”? This seemingly sim-
ple skill makes you able to exhibit empathy; you are endowed with it; you have 
an empathic personality; you are empathically disposed. The term empathy has 
become a linguistic commonplace in everyday communication as well as in inter-
disciplinary research. The core of the issue was already very well familiar to Plato 
(Ion 535e): his rhapsode knows that if he cries while declaiming his poem, he will 
succeed in making his audience identify with himself and make them eventually 
cry. In the end, Ion will laugh: he knows the audience will pay him, because 
everyone feels satisfied for having shared a common suffering. Aristotle (Poetics 
1449b) repeated the scheme for the theatrical experience: the audience attend-
ing the representation of intense emotional situations (homicides, parricides and 
matricides, infanticides, suicides and various other horrors) identifies with the 
tragic hero or heroine, spectators suffer with him or her, they are deeply touched 
for his or her destiny and they feel pity for his or her fate. The audience feels 
not only pity but also terror because of the similarity of the acted situation to 
the experience that might occur in life circumstances. These few examples show 
that since the beginning of its conceptualization, empathy has been linked to the 
fictional and artistic dimensions.
But how does a person empathize? The process of empathy brings up a few ques-
tions and issues, which are yet unresolved. For instance, is it a mental or a bodily 
process? Is it a conscious or rather unaware and unconscious one? Is it intentional 
or involuntarily, direct or indirect, rational or instinctual or logical or emotional? 
Is it innate, inherited or acquired? Is it a talent, a gift or a skill that we can learn 
and improve? Is it a right, a duty, a pleasure or a pain? Who are “the others” with 
whom we empathize? Are the others like us, just human beings? Do we prefer to 
empathize only with those who are similar to us: persons of the same sex, same 
age, same ethnicity, who speak our language, share our skin colour and have sim-
ilar jobs and who share with us the passion for a certain kind of music, sport or 
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book? Do the others belong to our same social class and are they raised within a 
similar educational model?
Rather the opposite might be true: we empathize with others because of their 
being different – unlike, heterogeneous. The ancient antipodal questions raised 
by the Greek philosophers – does alike attract alike or do opposites attract them-
selves? – become crucial once again. Do such attitudes rest on a biological basis?
Examining any online library, catalogue or even Amazon.com shows us the aston-
ishingly high number of books about empathy published in the last decades. 
Beyond traditional domains concerning the constitution of intersubjectivity (in 
both philosophical and psychosociological sense) and the artistic experience, we 
now find specific studies on the crucial role played by empathy in very hetero-
geneous fields: evolutionary psychology and the educational sciences; ethics and 
politics; linguistics, communication science and media theory; cultural studies 
and gender studies; medicine and caregiving; law studies, criminology and vic-
timology; neuroeconomics and neuromarketing and theology and the theory of 
religions. Economist Jeremy Rifkin and primatologist Frans de Waal, two estab-
lished scholars widely appreciated by the large international audience, simultane-
ously published two large studies devoted: the title of the first one is The Empathic 
Civilization (2009) and the second one is The Age of Empathy (2009). Accord-
ing to Rifkin, not homo homini lupus but rather homo empathicus is the key to 
understand the authentic essence of human nature. In De Waal’s opinion, homo 
is empathicus because in each person there is still the empathic monkey residing.
In addition to these investigations in the field of intersubjective empathy, a spe-
cific attention for objectual empathy (namely, empathy subject–object: Pinotti, 
2017) has revamped in recent years, partly due to the hot debate about the notion 
of “animation” in the domain of cultural anthropology (Tim Ingold, Philippe 
Descola, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro: see Harvey, 2015) and the wide diffusion 
of Alfred Gell’s notion of “agency” in the fields of literary studies and art theory 
(Gell, 1998). These lines of research attest an increased interest towards the “life 
of things” (that could be called an “Object Turn”). What all these research lines 
have in common is the rejection of an improper pan-humanization and an exces-
sive “subjectivization of empathy”.
The result of these different fundamental research questions, raised in the last 
hundred (and more) years, coming from different research areas, lacks in fact 
of a clear concept of empathy. Speaking about “uncertainties and differences in 
terminology in interdisciplinary research that have emerged over the last years”, 
as mentioned in the call for paper for the present issue of Gestalt Psychology, 
empathy is a case in point. A recent paper identified up to 43 distinct definitions 
of empathy (Cuff, Brown, Taylor, & Howat, 2014, p. 145).
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Already in 2006, de Vignemont and Singer described with a touch of irony the 
multiple definitions of empathy that created incomprehension and misunder-
standings within the scientific community: “There are probably nearly as many 
definitions of empathy as people working on the topic” (de Vignemont & Singer, 
2006, p. 435). An obstacle to the study of empathy is that there is no general 
consensus on the definition of empathy (Coplan, 2004), and therefore, many 
different phenomena such as sympathy, affective contagion, imitation and mind 
reading are mistaken with empathy. In her paper Understanding Empathy, Amy 
Coplan underlines the “conceptual confusion” and the difficulty of dealing with 
this concept due to “the number of competing conceptualizations circulating” 
(Coplan, 2011a, p. 4). In a more recent study, with the funny and meaningful 
title Will the real empathy please stand up? (2011b), she responds to the lack of a 
clear and agreed definition of empathy with her narrower definition. By encom-
passing the broader definition of empathy such as the one of Frans de Waal, who 
uses it as an umbrella concept to describe an array of psychological processing 
(such as mimicry, mirroring, bodily synchronization and emotional contagion), 
Coplan proposes her own definition of empathy, which should be understood 
as a complex, imaginative process through which an observer simulates another 
person’s situated psychological states while maintaining clear self–other differen-
tiation (Coplan, 2011b, p. 40).
In fact, the lacking conceptualization of empathy has not yielded any agreement 
thus far (Batson, 2011). Fagiano (2016), who pleads for a pluralistic concept of 
empathy, finds De Waal’s broad definition of empathy extremely useful. Contrary 
to Amy Coplan, he avoids to give a precise definition and appreciates the plurality 
of voices that have termed “empathy” throughout history within different academic 
disciplines. By welcoming multiple historical conceptualizations of empathy, he 
tries to give value to the various contexts in which these concepts were settled.
We believe that a too broad concept of empathy ends up in producing a vague 
or incomprehensible concept and an “anything goes” discussion. Following the 
attempts of Amy Coplan and Benjamin Cuff (Cuff et al., 2014) to find a shared 
understanding of this complex concept, the following paragraphs will serve to 
analyse the reasons for the lack of a clear concept of empathy and highlight two 
deficiencies in the research and theorization of empathy that create misleading 
interpretations of it.
2. The Causes for the Lack of a Clear Definition
a. The Intricate History of Empathy
The history of the concept of empathy is as complex (Pinotti, 2016) as it is the 
phenomenon it describes. Empathy is used in different ways, each referring to 
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a constellation of experiences so different that one often despairs of successfully 
reducing them to a common denominator.
Empathy has not enjoyed an easy path in the course of the history of ideas. Its 
success attracted severe, even ferocious criticism, often taking it abruptly from 
riches to rags. After the first seminal appearances in proto-Romantic, late eigh-
teenth century Germany and with ever greater force in the 1870s, Einfühlung 
(this is how empathy sounds in German) gained power and became, between the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a veritable “Open Sesame”, capa-
ble of enlightening an entire range of problems concerning our experience with 
things (especially, with the beautiful objects in art and nature) as well as with our 
relationships to others.
If in its first two phases, empathy substantially spoke German; with the English 
translation of Einfühlung into empathy (Titchener, 1909), a third phase was inau-
gurated under the dominance of the psychological researches in the Anglo-Saxon 
world, a dominance whose effects have been so deep that even today in Germany, 
the term coined on the English – Empathie – is preferred to the controversial and 
now old-fashioned Einfühlung. By the 1930s, the term empathy was a common 
currency in the psychological vocabulary: the Journal of Experimental Psychology 
announced a photographic device for recording empathic reactions in motor 
experiences (Gordon, 1934). Thanks to a growing trust in the reliability of psy-
chological test procedures during the 1950s, the scientific measurement of empa-
thy began in earnest. An impressive amount of psychological studies exploring 
empathy in every aspect followed, each analysing analogies and differences with 
cognate and yet not identical experiences such as sympathy, emotional contagion, 
affective fusion and perspective taking.
The fourth phase of empathy, the neuroscientific one, started in the Eighties of 
the last century and was triggered by the discovery of the mirror neurons by a 
team of neurologists of the University of Parma (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008). 
This historical excursus highlights that during the last 100 years, empathy has 
moved across disciplines and cultural contexts. This mobility certainly contrib-
uted not only to its fortune but also to its conceptual vagueness.
b. The Ideological Concept of Empathy
Despite the lack of a clear distinction, in the last 20 years, literary empathy has 
certainly been the most discussed and studied effect of aesthetic artefacts. This 
“empathy hype” in the humanities has been mostly inspired by the neurocogni-
tive wave and is also backed by strategic reasons within the academic world and 
specifically the humanities, as it aids in the aim of showing that cultural activities 
and engagement with aesthetic objects have a positive effect on social life.
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Important scholars of the European cultural heritage, such as Martha Nuss-
baum (1997), claim that literature cultivates the human capacity for prosocial 
behaviour, including empathy, theory of mind, social cognition, perspective tak-
ing, altruism, as well as general cognitive abilities. For Nussbaum (1995, p. xvi), 
reading literature triggers an empathic involvement that is “an essential ingredi-
ent of an ethical stance that asks us to concern ourselves with the good of other 
people whose lives are distant from our own”. Recent experiments showing that 
literary reading has a positive short- and long-term effect on our empathic abil-
ities (e.g. Stansfield & Bunce, 2014; Kidd & Castano, 2013; Johnson, 2011, 
2013; Mar, Oatley, Hirsh, dela Paz, & Peterson, 2006) seem to confirm this 
viewpoint, and our educational system is widely based on this assumption. The 
same seems to apply to music listeners (Wallmark, Deblieck, & Iacoboni, 2018). 
For these authors, literature and the arts seem to enhance moral and prosocial 
attitudes (Koopman & Hakemulder, 2015). In these studies, empathy not only 
describes a psychological phenomenon but is mixed up with the ideological per-
spective of the author of the article or theory.
This ideological perspective on empathy also produced methodological shortcom-
ings. The texts used in these experiments “were designed to induce compassion-
ate feelings for the characters and model prosocial behaviour” (Johnson, 2012, 
p. 151). The characters of these stories, e.g. an orphan girl in Botswana (Stansfield & 
Bunce, 2014), are not typical in the history of literature and preclude a gener-
alization of the results. There are at least two aspects that impede their general-
ization: first, there are literary genres that do not demand an empathic reaction, 
such as obscure poetry and certain types of theatre plays demanding an “estrange-
ment effect” in the wake of Brecht’s anti-empathic alienation. Second, the history 
of literature offers numerous examples of amoral attitudes in novels, dramas and 
poems. Rebekka Kricheldorf ’s play Homo Empathicus (2017) paradoxically shows 
how cruel mankind can be, even in the artistic dimension.
Moreover, these studies only focus on positive emotions in art reception and 
positive concepts of fictional empathy. The link between literature, empathy 
and prosocial behaviour has been overemphasized and has occluded significant 
aspects of the aesthetic experience of literary texts. Although it is unquestion-
able that literature does enhance empathic reactions, the nature of these reac-
tions remains uncertain, as exemplified by recent studies (Johnson, 2011, 2013; 
Stansfield & Bunce, 2014), which could not elucidate whether the reactions 
during literary reading are weaker or stronger than during other activities such 
as watching TV, playing video games (see Happ, Melzer, & Steffgen, 2015) and 
real-world communication. Furthermore, it is completely unclear how these 
non-aesthetic empathic reactions interfere with genuine aesthetic reactions to the 
literary text and its appreciation. Yet, it is uncertain to what kind of “literary” 
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features, such as rhetorical figures and stylistic elements, these empathic reactions 
can be attributed. In relation to these studies, Keen (2007, p. 99) has concluded 
that “the faith in the relationship between reading narratives and moral or social 
benefits is so strong that it remains a bedrock assumption of many scholars, phi-
losophers, critics, and cultural commentators”.
In the current psychological discussion on empathy, the link between empathy 
and ethics represents one of the hottest topics (Prinz, 2011). In his 2011 pub-
lished book Empathy and the Science of Evil, Simon Baron-Cohen (one of the 
most important empathy theorists and the creator of the notorious test to assess 
cognitive empathy) has tried to redefine “evil” as an absence of empathy (Baron- 
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). Through the analysis of sev-
eral historical examples, Baron-Cohen attempts to substitute “the non-scientific 
term of evil with the scientific term empathy erosion” (Baron-Cohen, 2011, XII). 
Thus, he states the full equivalence between ethical and psychological concepts. 
Paul Bloom replied violently to Cohen’s reductionist positions on ethics in a noto-
rious article entitled “Against Empathy” on October 10th, 2014 Boston Review 
and later with a pamphlet with the same title (Bloom, 2016). The controversy on 
the link between empathy and prosocial or moral behaviour became widespread 
in the scientific community and gained also the attention of the media and the 
wider audience (Cameron, Inzlicht, & Cunningham, 2015).
The distinction between empathy and sympathy is a clear example demonstrating 
the entanglement of ethical and ideological issues in the discussion on empathy. 
In the terminology, one constantly slips from sympathy to empathy and vice 
versa: what for Batson (1991) is genuine “empathy” corresponds to Hoffman’s 
“sympathetic distress” (1991) and to Darwall’s “sympathy” (1998). Pleading for 
their clear separation, Wispé (1986) has remarked the affective connotation of 
sympathy with respect to the cognitive nature of empathy: the first would indi-
cate an intensified awareness of the other’s suffering as something that needs to be 
relieved; the second would refer to the attempt to understand the experiences of 
another subject. Sympathy, therefore, has to do with an emotional relationship to 
the situation of the other that tends to elicit a response in terms of action; empa-
thy has rather to do with a knowledge of the other and the experiences, positive 
or negative, that he or she is living. In empathy, emphasis thus falls on the ego 
that activates itself to understand the other and his/her feelings. In this case, it is 
very important to develop the so-called “empathic accuracy”, an exact precision 
in respectfully identifying and circumscribing those feelings that the other is liv-
ing, without projecting oneself on the other. In contrast, in the case of sympathy, 
there is a communion in which self-awareness is reduced to the full advantage of 
“being-moved” from the conditions of the other.  Berthoz and Thirioux (2010) 
consider sympathy as akin to emotional contagion (with no need to adopt the 
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other’s point of view), whereas empathy implies a complex assumption of spa-
tial reference frames, which are neither egocentric nor heterocentric, but rather 
allocentric.
For Nancy Eisenberg, too, sympathy has to be distinguished from empathy. She 
defines “‘sympathy’ as an emotional response that consists of feeling sorrow or 
concern for the distressed or needy other (rather than feeling the same emotion 
as the other person). Sympathy is believed to involve other-oriented, altruistic, 
motivation” (Eisenberg, 2000, p. 677). Similarly, for Coplan (2011a, 3-18), 
empathy is not sufficient for morality, whereas sympathy, at least on most 
accounts, does involve the appropriate moral motivation. An important impli-
cation in this definition is that sympathy implies concern for another’s well- 
being (Schramme, 2017), while empathic reactions can occur with any con-
cern for the well-being of others. However, there is no consensus on the moral 
nature of empathy; for Michael Slote, empathy is the “cement of the moral 
universe” as a mechanism that allows our moral approval and disapproval 
(Slote, 2010, p. 33).
Jolliffe and Farrington believe that both empathy and sympathy define a state of 
emotional congruence between two people. Nevertheless, “in the case of affective 
empathy, this reaction is the same emotion as the target person (emotion con-
gruence)” (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006, p. 591), whereas for sympathy, the two 
people do not necessarily share the same emotion. In addition, sympathy seems 
to involve an additional appraisal regarding this emotional understanding. For 
them, sympathy implies a moral evaluation, whereas empathy, feeling with some-
body, is more neutral and could even exist without identification (cf. Nussbaum, 
2003, pp. 325–327).
The distinction between sympathy and empathy is crucial in aesthetics and media 
psychology because morally evil stories and bad heroes are typical for modern 
and contemporary aesthetics. These immoral figures demand a specific audience 
response that can trigger empathy but not sympathy, which involves a moral 
judgement (Salgaro & Van Tourhout, 2018).
c. Empathy Put to the Test
Given the high uncertainty and confusing vagueness in defining a radically sub-
jective experience such as empathy, should we perhaps let “objectivity” do the job 
for us? In its aspiration to scientific status, modelled on the paradigm of mathe-
matics, psychology needs numbers (“objectivity”): “psychometrics”, understood 
as a technique of measuring psychic activity in its various aspects, is its spearhead. 
Empathy has not escaped the attention of this metric of the soul but has given 
and continues to give the measurers a hard time.
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How can I measure something without knowing exactly what it is? It is difficult 
to try to prove the reliability of the measurement scales and tests lacking a precise 
and concise definition of the concept in question. If we consider the instructions 
given to the subjects to be measured (“Empathize this and that, and report what 
you feel”), the subjects may not know exactly what they should do and may end 
up interpreting the command in a very heterogeneous way. If the instructions are 
indirect, and for example make use of synonyms (“Try to identify yourself with 
this or that”, “Try to imagine what this or that feels like” and so on), the results 
are conditioned by a preliminary surreptitious definition of empathy (empathy is 
identification or imagination of an extraneous state of mind and so on). We could 
mention many examples.
The Feshbach Affective Situation Test for Empathy (FASTE), developed by 
Feshbach and Roe in 1968 for school children, aims to measure the so-called 
“affect match”, namely, the affective correspondence of lived feelings: it there-
fore conceives empathy as an identity of felt experiences. Moreover, the linguistic 
formulation of the answers risks privileging the cognitive and to underestimate 
the emotional implications (Hoffman, 1982). The 1987 Empathy Continuum 
Scoring System (ECSS) developed by Janet Strayer achieved a better balance 
between cognitive and affective aspects. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), 
designed by Mark H. Davis in 1983, gained criticism because of its lack of a pre-
cise distinction between sympathy and empathy: in 2006, Jolliffe and Farrington 
proposed a new questionnaire on empathy by criticizing the IRI and other tradi-
tional empathy questionnaires. They highlighted that in IRI items such as “Other 
people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal” and “I am often 
touched by things that I see happen”, empathic and sympathetic reactions are 
confounded (see also Singer et al., 2006).
A general problem in the elaboration of the empathy scales and the question-
naires consists of the fact that the formulation of the questions and the situations 
presented to the subjects is conditioned from a sociocultural point of view (char-
acterized by this or that system of values) and can give very different results. To 
address such issues, the Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy was developed (Wang 
et al., 2003): a self-assessment tool aimed at measuring ethnocultural empathy, 
i.e. the ability of a subject to interact emphatically with other subjects belonging 
to different cultures and ethnic groups.
However, if we entrust the measurement of empathy to evaluation procedures 
that are based on verbalization by the subjects of their moods and on the verbal 
description of the experiences of others, will we not be looking for empathy 
at a too refined and too controlled level of cognitive, predicative and concep-
tual processing, which is precisely what is expressed in verbal language? New 
questionnaires like the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET), which consists of a 
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series of photographs depicting people in emotionally charged situations, were 
introduced to overcome the gap between real-world interactions and the writ-
ten descriptions in the items of the psychology questionnaires (Dziobek et al., 
2008). Not surprisingly, also the “Reading the mind in the eyes test by Baron 
Cohen” (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), which assesses cognitive empathy, is based 
on visual stimuli of faces.
If empathy is an emotion (Bischof-Köhler, 1989), that is a movement of the soul 
that manifests itself in a movement of the body, should not we rather look for 
empathy in this body itself to catch somatic indexes (postures, gestures, facial 
expressions) and physiological signs (sweating and heartbeat, respiration and 
electrical conductance of the skin) that reveal, before words, an empathic dis-
position or condition? Moreover, the exploration of such factors would have the 
advantage of being applicable to “infant” subjects who still do not have language 
skills. With respect to the undoubted advantages offered by this type of measure-
ment, however, it should be noted that precisely because it deals with primitive 
reactions, it is problematic to determine if their rise is specifically caused by an 
empathic experience or if some other cause is at stake.
Two remarks are here necessary at the epistemological level. Firstly, lacking a 
shared definition of the concept, this categorical indeterminacy reverberates on 
the measurement procedures, the construction of which obviously depends on 
the preliminary meaning of “empathic experience”: it would perhaps be exag-
gerated to say that the psychometric processes find in what they evaluate what 
they themselves had previously put into it, but certainly, the problem is not to be 
underestimated. Second, one should consider such measurements in the light of 
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle: no observation renders the observed as it is 
without remnants but in rendering it at the same time that it modifies it. There is 
no direct access to the object of observation; this is not a transparent and neutral 
procedure but a selective one that is both reconstructive and constructive. Thus, 
an empathy test does not immediately give us back the empathic capacity of a six-
year-old child, but the empathic ability of a six-year-old who answers not only to a 
questionnaire but simultaneously to a researcher. Similarly, brain imaging does not 
pinpoint only what happens in my brain when I empathize with a friend in need, 
but rather what happens in my brain when I empathize with a friend in need and 
at the same time undergo an fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging).
3. Contributions to a New Definition of Fictional Empathy
a. Empathy in Real Life and in a Fictional Context
In the field of aesthetics and literary theory, we believe that the main issue con-
cerns the lack of distinction between empathy among human beings in everyday 
life and empathy within a fictional context.
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In literary theory, empathy has always been considered one of the most typical 
reactions to a literary text, which differentiates literature from all other genres 
(Keen, 2007). It also played an important role in philosophical aesthetics (Pinotti, 
2016). However, the abstract concept of the “implied reader” in traditional reader 
response theories did not allow the study of literary empathy in actual readers. 
Thus, empirical studies of literature have tried to shed light on the empathic 
reactions of actual readers (Sopčák, Salgaro, & Herrmann, 2016). Furthermore, 
recent findings in psychological research suggest that reading fiction is related 
to an increased empathic ability (Djikic, Oatley, & Moldoveanu, 2013, Mar, 
Oatley, & Peterson, 2009). However, instead of highlighting the peculiarities of 
literary empathy, psychological research tends to consider literary empathy and 
empathy in everyday life as equivalents (Mar & Oatley, 2008).
Keith Oatley, who participated in these experiments (see Mar et al., 2006, 2009; 
Mar & Oatley, 2008), seems to support this kind of misinterpretation when he 
claims that “fiction is a set of simulations of social worlds that we can compare, 
as it were stereoscopically, with aspects of our everyday world” (2016, p. 618). In 
contrast, Suzanne Keen underlines the fictional quality of the imaginary world 
elicited by the literary texts. It has no consequence in our everyday life. This 
fictionality has an impact also on our empathic feelings because “the perception 
of fictionality releases novel-readers from the normal state of alert suspicion of 
others’ motives that often acts as a barrier to empathy” (Keen, 2007, p. 169). It 
is necessary to consider the aesthetic dimension of fictional empathy by study-
ing the specific features of narrative, such as descriptions of sensations, meta-
phors and metonyms, which may trigger or block the arousal of empathy and 
identification. For example, it is still unclear whether the narrative perspective 
(e.g. first-person narratives or third-person narratives) is relevant in triggering 
the empathic reaction of the reader (Kaufman & Libby, 2012, p. 3; van Lissa, 
Caracciolo, Duuren, & van Leuveren, 2016).
The above-mentioned studies on literary reading do not fully take into account 
the peculiar aspects of literary empathy, which include, among many others, the 
rhetorical figures and the aesthetic and stylistic elements. Consequently, there are 
still some open questions that need to be answered: which are the textual features 
triggering fictional empathy? What is the difference between fictional empathy 
and empathy in everyday life? What relation exists between a person’s reading 
habits, his or her personality and the “empathy state” elicited by the actual read-
ing activity? Are there links between the aesthetic appreciation of a text and its 
empathic potential?
Identification seems to be a concept, which is more suited to underline the dis-
tinction between the real and fictional world. For Cohen (2001, p. 251), “it 
is defined here as a response to textual features that are intended to provoke 
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identification”. Unlike identification with social groups or leaders, “identification 
with media characters is a result of a carefully constructed situation” (ibid.).
In the domain of visual arts, a ground-breaking attempt has been made in 2007, 
thanks to the cooperation of an art historian (David Freedberg) and a neurophys-
iologist (Vittorio Gallese). Their proposal rests on the above-mentioned discovery 
of the mirror neurons as a possible biological basis for empathy; however, in this 
case, the addressee of the empathic experience is not a human being in the flesh, 
but rather the figure represented in a picture. We empathetically understand the 
situations that art presents us because, when we see actions represented in the 
artworks, our mirror system “fires” as if such actions were performed by our-
selves. By watching Bernini’s Ecstasy of Santa Teresa, three main axes articulate 
our empathic response: “i) The feeling of bodily engagement with the gestures, 
movements and intentions of others; ii) the identification of the emotions of 
observed others; iii) a feeling of empathy for bodily sensations” (Freedberg & 
Gallese, 2007, p. 201). According to Freedberg and Gallese (2007, p. 202), even 
in the case of abstract art, the observer can trace back the origin of the gesture that 
produced the image in the movement of the artist’s body, empathizing with the 
motor track of the creative moment: “We propose that even the artist’s gestures 
in producing the artwork induce the empathetic engagement of the observer, 
by activating simulation of the motor program that corresponds to the gesture 
implied by the trace”. A dripping by Pollock, a cutting by Fontana and a painting 
by Franz Kline (Sbriscia-Fioretti, Berchio, Freedberg, Gallese, & Umiltà, 2013) 
are images able to raise a resonance in us and an implicit simulation of the ges-
tures performed to produce them.
Analogous applications of the mirror neuron system have also been extended 
to empathic experiences with music (Molnar-Szakacs & Overy, 2006), dance 
(Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2004), architecture 
(Mallgrave, 2012, 2013) and cinema (Gallese & Guerra, 2012).
b. Interspecies Empathy
As human beings are able to establish empathic relations with non-human beings 
such as fictional characters, further questions arise. Is empathy an affair that occurs 
exclusively among human beings, be they similar or not? We can ask further: are 
the “others” really just humans? Is it an experience confined within that domain 
philosophically labelled “intersubjectivity”, i.e. the sphere of relationships between 
subjects? Are we not here arrogating to ourselves the privilege of the empathic 
experience, guilty of the millenary propensity to consider ourselves to be the acme 
of the creatural pyramid – as special entities, bequeathed with competencies and 
abilities withheld from the realms of animal, vegetal, mineral worlds, realms with 
which we actually share not little from an evolutionary and phylogenetic point of 
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view? Should we not be perhaps more modest and at least accept the hypothesis 
that empathy might also be found where we least expect it: among mice, moulds, 
flowers and stones? We are constantly interacting with the non-human world, and 
it is neither a source of mystery nor of guilt that many feel closer to the existence 
of an animal or to an inanimate object – a room, a car, or a landscape – than to a 
person. Should not we at least verify the possibility of an empathic experience with 
such entities, including the possibility that it may be mutual?
Sacks (1995) has presented the paradigmatic case of Temple Grandin: a 
zoologist suffering from autism who has been able to draw on complex studies 
related to the emotional sphere of animals in order to elaborate a conception of 
man–animal relationship in which humans are invited to put themselves in the 
animal’s perspective without reducing the animal affective world to the human 
model. (Grandin & Johnson, 2009). Bekoff (2007). So he collected a series 
of amazing cases in the animal world (young antelopes adopted by lionesses, 
shipwrecked men rescued by dolphins), which call for empathy not only in an 
intraspecific sense but also in an interspecific sense.
What should we finally say of the post-human: Of those who come “after” us and 
yet not “below” us but, as it were, “beyond” us? Since the 1940s, at least – when 
Norbert Wiener established cybernetics as the discipline exploring human interface 
with machines and compared automatic control procedures in both organic and 
inorganic realms, that is, nervous systems versus robotic devices – the exponential 
development of the so-called artificial intelligence and biotechnology has signifi-
cantly transformed the status of the “human”, implementing their operativity with 
more and more sophisticated prostheses that, thanks to the parallel progress in nan-
otechnologies, are becoming simultaneously more powerful and more diminutive. 
Soon we will not wear them on ourselves like glasses, mobile phones or tablets but 
rather into ourselves as a constitutive component of our body. Domotics, allowing 
us to control the functions of the “smart” home – automated heating, washing, 
alarm system, curtains, gates and doors through touch screens, voice recognition 
devices and subcutaneous RFID (Radio- Frequency IDentification) implants – is 
already a reality. It is a reality that science fiction brilliantly prophesized in litera-
ture and cinema, making us familiar with the cyborgs, cybernetic organisms that 
are no longer human but not yet inhuman. For example, in Philip K. Dick’s 1968 
novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? and in the film Blade Runner, the char-
acters and their fates whirl around the crucial issue of empathy – between humans, 
between humans and animals (true animals and droid animals), between humans 
and androids, between animals and androids and, finally, between androids.
These issues raise the question of the nature of the so-called empathy in com-
puter-mediated communication (CMC) (Rooksby, 2007, pp. 39–70): a huge 
research field considering the ever-increasing amount of time we daily spend 
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interacting with other subjects not in flesh but rather via screen or through a 
digital proxy, the avatar, which dramatically enlarges our conventional notion of 
intersubjectivity (Schroeder, 2002): a theme that has been brilliantly dealt with 
in Her, the movie directed by Spike Jonze in 2013.
In this regard, the android industry represents a particularly stimulating domain 
for a “CMC” theory of empathy: let us think of Geminoid-F, realized in 2010 
by Hiroshi Ishiguro: a young woman capable of modulating facial expressions 
and intonations of the voice to different emotional expressions (see the website 
www.geminoid.jp and Sakamoto & Ishiguro, 2009). In a theatrical pièce entitled 
Sayonara, staged by director Oriza Hirata, Geminoid-F appears as a character, 
who takes care of a woman suffering from cancer, (repudiated by her family) 
accidentally met on the street: if we think that counselling and caregiving are the 
practices that require high empathic abilities, we immediately understand the 
provocative relevance of this humanoid caregiver, whose availability to human 
care seems to challenge the “Uncanny Valley” effect described almost fifty years 
ago by Mori (1970; see also Misselhorn, 2009). On the dark side of this coin, the 
authors of the series Westworld (Jonathan Nolan and Lisa Joy for HBO, 2016) 
have displayed hyperrealistic androids undistinguishable from the human beings 
in a theme park where the systematic trespassing of ethical norms is the rule (until 
the cyborg slaves decide to rebel against their human masters).
SCI-FI movies like the Predator saga (1987; sequels: Predator 2, 1990; Predators, 
2010) and its crossing with the Alien saga (Alien vs. Predator, 2004; Aliens vs. 
Predator: Requiem, 2007) interestingly pose the question of the possibility of an 
empathic perspective taking between humans (both intradiegetic characters and 
external spectators) and alien forms of life, starting from the basic problem of 
perception and its structural constraints: thermal or electromagnetic views must 
always be rendered in a way that is perceivable by the human eye, limited to a 
spectrum between the infrared and the ultraviolet.
Discussion
“What is this thing called empathy?” The question recently raised by Nelems 
(2018) seems far to be uncontroversial and definitively answered. Along the line 
connecting Plato’s past to the future announced by Blade Runner, a broad spec-
trum of issues is deployed for which “empathy” functions as an umbrella term 
covering a net of categorical relationships that can be only partially overlapped: 
projection, transfer, association, expression, animation, anthropomorphization, 
vivification and fusion. Empathizing means in different contexts identifying, 
re-enacting, expressing compassion or consent, interiorly imitating and sympa-
thizing. If, on one hand, such a protean constellation proves the great ductility 
of the notion of empathy, it risks, on the other hand, to diffuse its contours to 
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the point of indistinctness. There are, in fact, authors who deny the pertinence 
and utility of the notion of empathy for understanding the experiences of oth-
ers. There are, additionally, authors who claim that, in the last analysis, nothing 
accountable and definable truly corresponds to the word.
Our conclusive suggestion is not so radical, but rather rests on a very simple advice: 
anyone referring to “empathy” as a fundamental key concept in their argumenta-
tion should not take it for granted and self-evident, but start with a crystal-clear 
definition and delimitation, so that the reader can identify the single star in the 
dozens that have historically composed the empathy constellation, because we 
only wonder about the stars in the sky when we share the view with someone else.
Summary
The term empathy has become a linguistic commonplace in everyday communication as 
well as in interdisciplinary research. The results of the research questions, raised in the last 
hundred (and more) years, coming from different areas, such as aesthetics, psychology, 
neurosciences and literary theory, lack in fact a clear concept of empathy. Not surpris-
ingly, a recent paper has identified up to 43 distinct definitions of empathy in academic 
publications. By reconstructing the main research lines on empathy, our paper highlights 
the reasons for this conceptual inadequacy and the deficiencies in the theorization of 
empathy that create misleading interpretations thereof. Along the line connecting Plato’s 
insights on empathic experiences to the present neuroscientific experiments, a broad spec-
trum of issues is deployed for which “empathy” functions as an umbrella term covering a 
net of categorical relationships – projection, transfer, association, expression, animation, 
anthropomorphization, vivification, fusion, and sympathy – that only partially overlap. 
Our paper therefore recommends that “empathy” should not be assumed as a self-evident 
notion but instead preliminarily clarified in its definition every time we decide to have 
recourse to it.
Keywords: Definition, history of empathy, interdisciplinarity.
Empathie oder Empathien?  
Unsicherheiten in der Interdisziplinären Diskussion
Zusammenfassung
Der Begriff “Empathie” ist sowohl in der alltäglichen Kommunikation als auch in der 
interdisziplinären Forschung ein linguistisches Allerweltswort geworden. Den wis-
senschaftlichen Forschungergebnissen aus unterschiedlichen Bereichen, wie Ästhetik, 
Psychologie, Neurowissenschaften, Literaturtheorie, aus den letzten hundert (und mehr) 
Jahren fehlt tatsächlich ein klares Konzept von Empathie. Wenig überraschend hat eine 
jüngere wissenschaftliche Publikation bis zu 43 unterschiedliche Definitionen von Empa-
thie in akademischen Beiträgen identifiziert. Unser Beitrag vollzieht die wesentlichen 
Forschungslinien über Empathie nach und beleuchtet die Gründe für diese konzeptio-
nelle Unzulänglichkeit sowie die Defizite in der Theoriebildung, die zu irreführenden 
Interpretationen von Empathie führen. Es wird, entlang der Linie von Plato´s Einsichten 
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über Empathie bis zu aktuellen neurowissenschaftlichen Experimenten, ein breites Spek-
trum an Themen entfaltet, für die “Empathie” als Regenschirm-Begriff ein ganzes Netz 
an kategorialen Beziehungen abdeckt – Projektion, Übertragung, Assoziation, Ausdruck, 
Animation, Vermenschlichung, Belebung, Verbindung, Sympathie – die sich nur teil-
weise überschneiden. Unser Beitrag empfiehlt daher, dass “Empathie” nicht als selbster-
klärender Begriff vorausgesetzt wird, sondern im Vorfeld jedes Mal, wenn wir meinen, auf 
ihn zurückgreifen zu müssen, in seiner Definition geklärt wird.
Schlüsselwörter: Definition, Geschichte der Empathie, Interdisziplinarität.
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